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Abstract
Beside the traditional public-private dichotomy for the provision of public services,
an increasing attention has been devoted to the use of public-private partnerships
(PPPs). This paper compares relative ineﬃciencies of public provision, traditional
private provision and PPPs. It also analyses the eﬀect of workers’ eﬀorts and incentives
on the success of this new device.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The debate about public and private provision of public goods and services has always been
lively, both in the political and in the academic arena. Recently, the application of the
“incomplete contracts” framework has enriched this debate (Hart, 2003; Bennet and Iossa,
2004). The importance of contractual relationships is now even more emphasized by the
increasing relevance assumed by partnerships between public (central or local) authorities
and private ﬁrms. In this paper, we refer in particular to Public-Private Partnerships (hence-
forth, PPPs). The aim of this work is to present the main theoretical contributions to this
debate, to discuss some experiences across UK1, to introduce our models of partnerships and
workers’ contribution to performance and, ﬁnally, to provide policy suggestions.
The introduction of workers’ incentives is our main contribution. We believe that political
debate has said probably too much and conversely academia too little about this topic. As
a matter of fact, most of the political debate is nowadays focusing exactly on this point:
who should employ whom. For example, recent guidances for new partnership contracts
in Scotland2 explicitly underline that workers and unions should be informed about the
privatization process, that workers’ conditions are essential for a satisfactory provision of
the service and that two tier workforce should be limited. By two tier workforce, we refer
to the coexistence of workers who are employed under diﬀerent conditions. This is indeed a
very common situation in partnerships, where some of the staﬀ is usually transferred from
a public to a private employer.
The paper is organized as follows. In section two, we deﬁne partnership contracts, discuss
some of the main UK experiences of partnerships, and highlight advantages and drawbacks
of these choices. In section three, we present a review of the main theoretical literature.
In section four we introduce our main contribution: a model allowing for public provision,
beside private provision and PPP, and the presence of workers. We divide the section in two
parts, in order to have simpliﬁed versions of our model and better focus our analysis. Finally,
in section ﬁve we draw our general conclusions and provide policy suggestions implied by
the model.
2 Partnerships in UK
Partnerships are not a completely new device for the delivery of public services. For in-
stance, Scott Fosler and Berger (1982) witness the presence of partnerships in seven U.S.
municipalities during the ‘70s. More recently, Rossenau (2000) reports evidences from suc-
cessful American and British experiences. Nevertheless, the history of partnerships is not
always a list of successes: some of the ﬁrst partnership contracts failed to be satisﬁed and
still nowadays criticism arises when a new partnership is proposed3.
1An excellent review about some Italian cases can be found in Ambrosanio, Bordignon and Etro (2004).
2PFI Quarterly, various numbers. Available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/pﬁ.
3See, for example, www.unison.co.uk for the Scottish case.
2The rest of the section is organized as follows: ﬁrst we draw a brief historical background
of the policies which brought to the introduction and development of PPP contracts in UK;
then, we analyze diﬀerent types of partnerships and try to understand the main elements of
these contracts. Finally, we present a taste of UK experience and, in particular, we focus on
health, education and prisons.
2.1 From traditional private provision to PPP
The main arguments supporting the shift from public to private provision are usually con-
nected to the necessity of solving budget problems, without raising extra revenues, and the
desire to obtain eﬃciency gains.
The ﬁrst wave of privatization in the UK spread with PM Margaret Thatcher, during the
eighties. Despite some expected beneﬁts, new problems emerged: the government sold most
of its assets at an excessively low price, competition was not always possible, and beneﬁts
were unevenly distributed among management and employees (HM Treasury, 2000).
The ﬁrst half of the last decade opened with the introduction of Private Finance Initiative
(henceforth, PFI) contracts: in this way, the government wished to keep the level of public
investments high, to provide further incentives for private capital and, at the same time, to
retain an overall public control on the projects. Pollit (2000) classiﬁes three kinds of PFI
projects:
1. the public sector buys the service (e.g.: roads, prisons) from the private sector, which
is responsible for the capital investments;
2. the private sector designs, builds, ﬁnances and operates an asset; fees are paid by the
public authority over the life of the contract, providing the required standards are met
(Bennett and Iossa, 2004, and Hart, 2003, are based on these particular contracts,
henceforth referred as DBFO); according to the nature of the asset, the private sector
might in some cases directly charge the users (e.g., a bridge);
3. joint ventures between private and public sector.
Research, debate and propaganda mainly focused on the following most relevant elements
characterizing PFI contracts:
• the possibility of delaying payments as long as the contract would last;
• the transfer of risks from the public to the private sector;
• t h ea b i l i t yt op r o v i d e“ v a l u ef o rm o n e y ” :aP F Is h o u l db es e tu po n l yi ft h eo u t p u tc o u l d
be provided at a cheaper cost than by a diﬀerent type of provision (on a cost-beneﬁts
analysis).
3As it will become clearer later, we believe in Hart’s view, that is that PFIs ﬁnd their
peculiarity more in the length of the contract involved rather than the listed points. We add
to his theory the role of workers’ incentives which, at least initially, was not even considered
by policy makers.
These main characteristics (especially risk transfer and value-for-money) were also the
limits of this wave of PFI contracts. Even if the point is still debated (for example, see
Grout, 1997), it is not clear why the cost of the private project should be lower, as borrow-
ing for the private is more expensive than for the Government. Moreover, following Clark
and Root (1999, p. 352), “risk was assumed to involve: design and construction risk (...);
commissioning and operating risk (...); demand risk (...); residual value risk (...); technology
and obsolescence risk”. It is straightforward to understand that most of these risks could not
be speciﬁed ap r i o r ifor a lot of projects. Even lack of experience and of project management
skills in the public sector were such that progress in PFI projects in the early years was very
slow.
Despite all these limitations, ﬁrst failures could provide lessons for future agreements. It
is on the basis of these experiences that PPP contracts have been launched in Britain since
1997.
2.2 The elements of a PPP
Although they are often used as synonyms4, PPPs encompass a wider variety of relationships
than PFIs. According to Broadbent and Laughlin (2003), the main aspect diﬀerentiating
PPPs from traditional private provision is the presence of some control from the public
authority over the nature and pricing of the service oﬀered. This control is possible through
the exploitation of ownership rights. Now, as they recognize, this point is highly debatable.
Even if assets are not always technically owned by the public, we believe there is still scope
for economic (or political) ownership. In particular, it is important to understand who is
legally entitled to residual rights of control, which deﬁne what we call “economic ownership”.
We will soon come back to this important point when discussing the ﬂexibility of contracts.
A ﬁrst synthetic deﬁnition of partnership, obtained by collecting from diﬀerent sources
(see, for example, HM Treasury, 2000, p. 10, and IPPR, 2001, p. 40), is “a long term risk
sharing relationship between the public and the private sector to realize a mutual beneﬁt”.
This deﬁnition is quite comprehensive of the main elements of a partnership, which are listed
a n dm o r ee x t e n s i v e l yc o m m e n t e do nb e l o w .
• Private and public sectors. As regards the subjects involved, the deﬁnition above refers
to private ﬁrms (for proﬁto n e s ,v o l u n t a r ys e c t o ra n dc h a r ities) and public authorities,
being them central or local (but also, for example, hospitals trusts and central gov-
ernment departments). The main responsibilities for the latter subjects are political
ones, that is: deciding and deﬁning the objectives, ﬁx the standards (above all, quality
4This is true especially in academic research. According to this tradition, we decided to commit the same
language abuse through the paper.
4and quantity levels), monitoring the performances and ensuring that public interest is
safeguarded. In some sectors, the public authority also provides part of the staﬀ.T h e
contribution of the private sector is supposedly based on its better management and
business skills and eﬃciency driven culture. More precisely, public and private sectors
are only words, which nest a lot of diﬀerent stakeholders: customers, employees, private
sector investors, banks and taxpayers. Most of the existing theoretical models often
fail to consider the issues brought by each of these diﬀerent agents. In this sense, our
m o d e la c t sa saﬁrst step, through the concern given to public and private sector em-
ployees. Taking into account that beneﬁts must be shared among all the stakeholders
is becoming only nowadays a ﬁxed point in the political design of PPPs.
• Risk sharing. Within a partnership, risks should be borne by the party who can
best manage them. Normally, political risk, plus a share of market risk, is retained
by the public. It is this subject who is responsible for satisfying social needs. In
addition, charges might be still due to the private ﬁrm even if the demand for the
service drops (e.g., a demographic change leads to less pupils in a school). On the
contrary, construction, design, standard satisfaction, operating costs and delivery risks
are transferred to the private sector (and then reallocated within the consortium, when
existing). There is also a ﬁnal risk associated to the residual value of the facility, which
is borne by the party who owns it.
• Long term. The duration of a contract may vary from ﬁve to seven years for local
authorities outsourcing, and up to twenty-thirty years for schools. This “long-term”
characteristic of the contracts and the size of the projects give rise to diﬀerent prob-
lems. Pollit (2000) spots some particular diﬃculties. First, very often inputs and
outputs cannot be speciﬁed in contracts, especially when they deal with quality is-
sues. The less these items are sharply deﬁned, the less the incentives for the private
investors to respect the agreement. As already noticed, many risks are involved and
transferred from the public authority to the private agent. In order to avoid problems
(trials, delays, legal costs), they should be listed and speciﬁed. It is now very easy
to understand the necessity to assume “incompleteness” in models dealing with this
topic. Long-term contracts are also very hardly modiﬁable if unexpected contingencies
realize during the provision period. This lack of ﬂexibility is the source of well known
hold up problems. In theoretical models, a no cost renegotiation could partially solve
them. In reality, renegotiation is not always possible without breaking down the exist-
ing contract. With PFI contracts, key ﬂexibility rights are given to the public sector
(HM Treasury, 2003). In particular, provided an agreement on costs variation is found,
the public sector has the right to change any aspect of the building or service provision.
As anticipated above, this looks like a residual right of control over the asset, even if
this is not necessarily owned by the public subject5.
5In other terms, if the public authority bears the cost of the proposed change (i.e., it undertakes the
investment), then it does not need to share the additional beneﬁt with the private ﬁrm.
5• Relationship. Contracts are usually tailored on the speciﬁcc a s ef o l l o w i n gs t a n d a r d i z e d
schemes, in order to reduce writing and legal costs. Contracts specify outputs related
to the service required by the public sector, rather then inputs speciﬁcation and asset
characteristics; the basis for payment is also an element of the contract. Outputs
are typically designed in consultation with public sector workers (e.g., doctors and
teachers). The public sector evaluates bids received from the private ﬁrms and selects
an option. It is quite natural to expect a PPP to be signed when a public provision
would turn out to be more expensive. Unfortunately, it is not easy to compare costs and
beneﬁts of two diﬀerent providers. A PFI is likely to be chosen when it oﬀers greater
value for money, the investment horizon is suﬃciently long (no less than ﬁve years) and
outcomes can be well speciﬁed. Greater value for money means that the overall cost
of the PFI satisﬁes a public sector comparator (PSC) criterion. This criterion involves
comparisons about interest rates (the cost of borrowing), which are lower for a public
subject, and tax on private proﬁts (which can be transferred on the ﬁnal purchaser of
the good/service). The evaluation of the overall costs should be made also with regard
to other not economic aspects, such as employment condition. A further element of
the contract is the performance evaluation and the system of deductions and penalties
following poor standards levels. A constant monitoring of the performance of PFI
projects is therefore required.
• Mutual beneﬁt. Private and public sectors typically have diﬀerent objectives. Private
ﬁrms usually seek to maximize their proﬁts whereas public authorities, at least in
principle, wish to grant the highest beneﬁt to the society. The diﬀerence might be
less sharp when not-for-proﬁt organizations are concerned but, again, they do not
necessarily share the same utility function of society as a whole (on this point, see
Dixit, 2002b).
Finally, following IPPR (2001, pp. 40-41) and HM Treasury (2000, pp. 46-48), we can
list, and very brieﬂy comment on, some possible types of PPPs:
1. PFI, as explained above, which constitutes the dominant form of partnership in UK.
Variation of DBFO contracts are also possible, such as DBO or DBF agreements.
2. Wider markets: partnerships where private skills and ﬁnance should better exploit
public assets or human resources.
3. Long term service provision contracts: these are agreements where no building stage
is required but only management of existing assets.
4. Strategic (or policy) partnerships: agreements where the private sector is involved in
the development and implementation of public services.
5. Sales of businesses: they involve the sale of shares of state-owned businesses, with the
hope that the presence of private investments and market discipline would release the
full potential of these ﬁrms.
66. Joint ventures: partnerships with a pooling of public and private assets, ﬁnance and
workers under a common management.
2.3 Some UK experiences
PFI in England plays a still limited but increasingly relevant role in public sector capital
investment: 11% of total investment in public services in 2003-2004 is estimated to be due to
PFI6. These investments have now delivered more than 600 new public facilities, including
34 hospitals, 119 other health schemes and 239 schools. PFI is used following a particular
criterion, that is, it must oﬀer value for money and eﬃciency gains must not be made at the
cost of the workers’ conditions. First evaluations seem encouraging: of 61 chosen projects,
89% were delivered on time and 77% of public sector managers were happy with the delivery.
We now want to illustrate some particular experiences and cases of partnerships. There are
many examples we could choose from, but we shall focus on schools, hospitals and prisons, as
we ﬁnd them particularly relevant and inspiring for the theoretical model we have in mind.
We also concentrate on the employment aspects of these agreements. Other cases we do not
have the space to discuss here, like London Underground, Post Oﬃce, National Air Traﬃc
Service and British Nuclear Fuels, are exposed in Balduzzi (2000).
2.3.1 Health service and education
A common problem of these sectors (but probably of every PFI) was initially the diﬃculty
to develop and write contracts. After the very ﬁrst experiences, there is now a tendency to
use standardized (but ﬂexible) partnership contracts.
In the education sector, a wide typology of contracts is possible. For example (IPPR,
2001, p. 164):
• Design, build, ﬁnance and operate: this is the typical PFI contract, carried out by a
consortium of private ﬁrms; this consortium owns the school over the entire period of
the contract.
• Education Business Partnership: the private sector participates as future employer and
community stakeholder.
• Dual use Facilities: the private sector can recover part of its costs by exploiting the
facility for its own business.
• LEA (Local Education Authority) management and provision of services: the private
sector provides only strategic services, such as management.
In any of the possible schemes (which can be mixed as well), the Head and the Governing
Body of the school continue to be responsible for teaching, while cleaning and catering are
6If not diﬀerently and explicitly stated, the information in this subsection is based on HM Trasury (2000,
2003).
7provided by external staﬀ. The idea is that this choice allows schools to focus on their main
business (i.e.: education) and to raise their standards. Typically, some employees need to
be transferred to the private contractor (e.g.: the school Caretaker, IT technicians) whereas
the teaching staﬀ will be unaﬀected. In this case, the transferred staﬀ is protected by the
TUPE (Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment) Regulation of 1981. Moreover,
unions should be consulted as early as possible and service provider and Head teacher should
develop close relationships between them.
In the health sector7, PPPs always take the form of PFI contracts (in particular, DBFO).
The consortium is usually required to build and maintain the facilities for the contract period.
Employment design is similar to the one in education. The private sector provides ancillary
services such as catering, cleaning, laundry security and portering. The public subject is
responsible for the employment of clinical staﬀ: it is believed that, in this way, the quality of
the service would be better guaranteed. In addition, the contracts normally specify the range
of services to be delivered, the performance standards required and the price of the provision,
which is not due until services are provided to the agreed standard. The NHS has recently
d e v e l o p e da no r i g i n a ls y s t e mc a l l e dr e t e n t i on of employment (henceforth, RoE) in new PFI
hospitals8. Under RoE, some categories of the ancillary staﬀ are employed and retained as
NHS employees but seconded to work for the consortium. The objective is to avoid a two-tier
workforce but, in practice, the system is very complex and still highly debatable.
2.3.2 Prisons
Prisons constitute a really mixed sector. In England and Wales, custodial services are
provided in 137 prisons (NAO, 2003), belonging to the public sector, the (traditional) private
o n eo rt oP F I s .A m o n gt h e m ,t h e r ea r es o m ei n t e resting cases. Two prisons that were built
and ﬁnanced conventionally by the public sector are now run by private companies under
management-only contracts. Three other prisons, two of which had previously been operated
by the private sector, are now run by local management teams following successful in-house
bids. Finally, since 1995, the Prison Service has signed nine Private Finance Initiative (PFI)
contracts for new prisons, seven of which are already operational.
The most interesting aspect of this sector, at least according to the direction of our
research, concerns employment choices. The full range of services, from management to
staﬀ, is here provided by the PFI. And it is a relevant chapter because staﬀ costs account for
nearly 80% of the running costs of a prison. It is natural to think that eﬃciency gains in the
private sector might start exactly from the use of employees. And indeed the workforce has
been subject to some reduction. Two main problems, related to staﬀ conditions, are that
staﬃng level in some prisons (e.g., HMP&YOI Ashﬁeld; NAO, 2003) is failing to meet the
original agreement. Furthermore, there is a high degree of turnover and a consequent lack of
experience of constantly new employees. While most of the staﬀ is recruited in the market
or developed internally, senior managers positions are not. Directors have been recruited
7We focus here only on secondary care even if PPPs exist in primary and intermediate care as well.
8See http://www.ippr.org.
8from the ranks of previous Prison Service Governors (public employees).
3 Partnerships, Contracts and Workers: a Review
Several contributions have recently discussed privatization and partnerships in an incomplete
contracts framework. We also choose to develop our model in the well known “incomplete
contracts” framework introduced in subsequent papers by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart
and Moore (1990) and ﬁnally Hart (1995). From an empirical point of view, it should be
clear by now why partnership contracts would probably fail to be fully detailed. From a
theoretical point of view, two main similarities about our models are worth of analysis.
Among the other contributions they provide, these papers study the rationale for merging
( o rn o t )b e t w e e np r i v a t eﬁrms, whose objective is solely proﬁt, and the optimal employment
contract in these ﬁrms.
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have already enlarged these models in order to consider
a private ﬁrm and a government, whose objective function deals with quality rather than
proﬁt. This work provides criteria for the choice about contracting-out or not the provision
of a public good, but it is not speciﬁc for PPPs. In a following paper (Hart, 2003), part-
nerships are explicitly considered. The author oﬀers a new insight into the microeconomic
principles that PPPs are (or should have been) based on. His preliminary conclusions are
that conventional private provision (unbundling the construction of the facility and opera-
tion of the public service) is good if the quality of the building can be well speciﬁed in an
initial contract, whereas the quality of the service cannot be. A series of short-term con-
tracts (i.e.: more competition) will provide less distorted levels of investments. In contrast,
PPP (bundling construction and operation) is good if the quality of the service can be well
speciﬁed in a single long-term contract. Despite the advantages of his model, his analysis is
still preliminary and fails to consider the eﬀect of these two diﬀerent provision devices on
workers’ eﬀorts and the role of ownership.
First steps in the latter direction have been made by Besley and Ghatak (2001) and
Bennett and Iossa (2004)9.
The former contribution highlights how, when a public good is involved, ownership should
be based on valuations and not on investments or technology. The authors argue that
sometime it is socially better for private ﬁrms to own public assets (for instance, a school)
and focus their attention on not-for-proﬁt organizations, as they are more easily driven
towards public objectives. On the drawbacks of this form of provision, we must remember
Dixit (2002b). He shows that these ﬁrms might in fact have also additional objectives than
the government’s ones. The externality they produce by carrying on a public service needs
to be taken into account.
The latter contribution (Bennett and Iossa, 2004) is very similar to Hart (2003) in con-
sidering building and management as the two main stages of the partnership contract. But
PPP is now deﬁned as an ownership structure rather than simple “bundling” of these stages.
9See also Shleifer (1998) on the importance of innovation in ownership choice.
9In addition, they generalize the eﬀects of the builder’s investments on the running of the
project, in the sense that investments in the ﬁrst stage have either positive or negative eﬀects
on the costs in the second stage. They consider the problem of ownership and closely link
it with whether the externality is positive orn e g a t i v e . G i v e nt h eu s u a lh o l du pp r o b l e m
causing underinvestment, not internalizing a negative externality (unbundling the stages)
may indeed reduce the related ineﬃciency. With a positive externality, on the contrary,
PPP (ownership by a consortium) or public ownership must be preferred.
Several papers consider employment issues10.We choose to focus in particular on two
of them. Francois (2000) introduces “public service motivation” as a possible incentive for
workers employed in the public sector. The author develops a more formal approach, based on
economic rationality, rather than relying on psychological considerations. In his model, the
presence of market incentives may in fact diminish employees’ eﬀort. This happens because a
proﬁt oriented provider acts as a residual claimant and has an incentive in adjusting inputs
to fulﬁl the contract whenever a worker is underperforming. Even under public service
motivation, the worker prefers to shirk as the outcome will still be guaranteed. Relevant
elements of the model are the adjustment costs, the degree of substitutability of inputs and
the ability to write complete contracts about the outcome. Our model is diﬀerent, as he
deals with employers’ decisions about the production quantity rather than with investment
choices.
A peculiar approach is developed by Besley and Ghatak (2004). In their model, pro-
ductivity is increased by a correct match between the mission of an organization and the
motivation of its employees. In particular, motivation acts as a substitute of pecuniary in-
centives and contracting on the mission can provide a ﬁrm with more productive and cheaper
workers. We decided to develop a more explicit model, without using types as in Besley and
Ghatak (2004), but where objective functions of the players may have common elements.
Table 4.1: Literature review
Topic Author
Grossman and Hart (1986)
The incomplete contracts framework Hart and Moore (1990)
Hart (1995)
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
Public versus private ownership Besley and Ghatak (2001)
Bennett and Iossa (2004)
Grout (1997; 2003)
Partnerships Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2001)
Hart (2003)
Workers Francois (2000)
Besley and Ghatak (2004)
10See, for instance, Corneo and Rob (2003) or Delfgaauw and Dur (2004). Prendergast (1999) and Dixit
(2002a) provide excellent reviews for incentives respectively in private and public organizations.
10Finally, we must acknowledge the existence of other contributions about privatization
and partnerships. These models are less relevant to our purpose as they are either developed
in a diﬀerent framework or focus on diﬀerent aspects of partnerships (i.e., risk transfer). In
our opinion, the most relevant ones are by Grout (1997, 2003) and Bentz, Grout and Halonen
(2001). All the contributions are summarized in Table 4.1.
Grout’s papers deals with ﬁnancing and risk issues. In Grout (1997), the author chal-
lenges the common opinion that public sector provision necessarily implies lower risk than
private provision. The risk is the same even if the government can in fact borrow at a lower
rate. This lower rate is not an indication of lower risk, as this is transferred on the general
public in form of higher taxes in the future. Then, a standard criterion for implementing
PPP projects is that it should be cheaper for the Government to provide a service with a
PPP than with public provision. But this criterion raises questions about both the choice
of discount factors, in the private and in the public sector, and the reasons for their diﬀer-
ence. Starting from a pure ﬁnance test, Grout (2003) argues that discount rates used for
the public sector should be lower than for the private one. This result is not based on risk
arguments, but on the diﬀerent nature of costs considered for public or partnership provision.
It would disappear if the public authority chose to assess partnerships by their construction
and maintenance costs rather than by the contracting costs involved.
Finally, Bentz, Grout and Halonen (2001) adopt a complete contracts approach and focus
on the design of incentives from the public to the private sector. The distinction between PPP
and public provision is made on the basis of the choice, by the government, respectively to
purchase a service or a facility. When investments to make this facility eﬃcient for the service
are expensive, than public provision must be preferred. However, when these investments
are cheap and delivery costs are low, then PPP is a good choice.
In the next section, we ﬁnally present our original models of partnerships.
4M o d e l s o f P P P
The model we present builds on some previous papers, in particular by Hart (2003), Besley
and Ghatak (2004) and Francois (2000). Our contribution is related to the following themes:
• we allow for public provision; to do this, we assume the existence of two stages as in
Hart (2003), and that the government does not have the ability to build the facility.
There is still a private builder in the ﬁrst stage but there is room for more possibilities
in the second stage. If the provider is publ i c ,t h e nw eh a v ep u b l i cp r o v i s i o n ;i fi ti sa
diﬀerent private ﬁrm then we have traditional private provision; ﬁn a l l y ,i fw eh a v ea
consortium of the builder and the provider, we have a partnership;
• we allow for one additional investment in the second stage; we also allow for the
presence of workers in this stage: they can undertake some eﬀort inﬂuencing the level
of social beneﬁt and are consumers of the good they produce;
11• we try to motivate an explicit economic problem and not simply a problem based on
“types”: motivation refers to how the provision of the service inﬂuences the worker’s
utility.
We divide the problem in two stages: ﬁrst we allow for workers and public provision;
then we introduce some social costs related to the investment in the second stage.
4.1 Putting the workers into the picture
Hart (2003) does not consider workers. Besley and Ghatak (2004) do and focus their model
on the matching between employers and employees; yet, the relation between workers and
employers is based on types and not on explicit utility functions, as in our model. Finally,
Francois (2000) is closer to our contribution in making his “public service motivation” an
economical problem. Nevertheless, his model deals with employers’ decisions about the
production quantity rather than with investments choices.
Our aim is to introduce two corrections in Hart’s model. The ﬁr s to n ei sa b o u tt h e
presence of workers, as we believe their contribution is not irrelevant for the success of the
good or service under provision. The second one is about the possibility for the provider
to undertake some investments. In order to understand the relevance of these two new
elements, an example might be useful. Let’s consider a radiologist in a hospital. His ability
to diagnose an illness may depend on the accuracy of some exam: without, for instance, an
X-ray machine, he is not able to understand the problem of his patient. The choice of buying
or not this kind of machine is an investment bearing on the provider’s side. Finally, costlier
machines provide more accurate results, which are easier to interpret for the radiologist. In
other words, there is some complementarity between the investment of the employer and the
eﬀort of the worker. Both of them can inﬂuence the quality of the service which is provided
(in this case, health services).
We also want to diﬀerentiate our model from Besley and Ghatak (2004) by making
incentives for workers more explicit, without relying on matching of exogenous types or
psychological motivations. The worker can ﬁnd some satisfaction in his job, which is higher
the greater his contribution to the ﬁnal result. He may also enjoy the service himself as a
consumer. For instance, a teacher, whose chil d r e ng ot ot h es c h o o lw h e r eh ew o r k s ,m i g h t
have an incentive to improve the level of teaching.
We now present a ﬁrst version of the model, with a single worker. First we work out the
eﬃcient levels of investments, as a benchmark case. Then, we recall Hart’s results (Hart,
2003) which we are going to use. Finally, we discuss our original contribution to his model.
4.1.1 The setting
There are four subjects: a builder B, ap r i v a t ep r o v i d e rP, the government G, and a worker
L. The government G is not a social welfare maximizer agent strictu sensu11,b u to n l yc a r e s
11As it will become clear below (see Lemma 3 and Lemma 8), as long as we do not consider any social
cost caused by the provider’s investment, G eventually acts as a social welfare maximizer even if it is not
12about the social eﬀect of the service. This is measured by a social beneﬁtf u n c t i o nSB rather
than by the sum of the agents’ utility and proﬁt functions (worker, government itself and
ﬁrms). G could also be a public agency. In reality, this is the most natural interpretation.
We therefore need to assume that the objective functions of the government and of its
agency are the same. The production of the service requires two stages: a building one and
an operating one. In the former stage a facility or a capital asset is built; this is used in
the latter stage to actually provide the good or service. For instance, the facility can be a
school, a hospital or a prison. The building stage is technologically impossible for G, so it
must contract it out to B. Before this contract is signed, G must also decide which kind
of provider will operate the facility. G has three choices: it can operate the facility itself
(public provision), it can contract out the provision to an independent private provider P
(traditional private provision), or it can contract it out to the builder itself. The builder
can then subcontract the operational stage to P or form with him a consortium. We refer
to the latter as a PPP and we assume, for simplicity and without loss of generality, that
a partnership is precisely formed by a consortium of B and P.T h ew o r k e rL is employed
in the second stage: therefore he is a public employee under public provision and a private
employee under private provision or PPP.
All the subjects can undertake some non contractible eﬀo r to ri n v e s t m e n t s :e x a c t l ya si n
Hart (2003), the builder can decide whether to invest in i, a productive investment increasing
SB and decreasing operational costs OC for the provider (e.g., a nicer building which is also
easier to operate), and in e, an unproductive investment, decreasing both SB and OC (a
facility may be easier to operate but less safe to its users). We add two more investments.
First, the provider can invest in a, a productive investment with a positive eﬀect on SB (for
instance, a better or more powerful machine in a hospital or teaching instruments). Finally,
L can undertake some eﬀort on his job. This eﬀort d increases the quality, or level, of the
service which is provided. Recalling the example about the radiologist, it is clear that the
returns from these two investments, a and d, are mutually dependent: the result of a medical
test needs an interpretation to become a diagnosis; likewise, the radiologist’s opinion needs
to be funded on solid bases.
The utility functions of the agents under diﬀerent provision forms are the following:
Private provision Public provision Partnership
U
p
G = SB − λB − λP U
g
G = SB − λB − OC U
ppp
G = SB − λPPP
ΠB = λB − i − e ΠB = λB − i − e ΠPPP = λPPP − i − e − OC
ΠP = λP − OC
and
UL = w + δf(a,d) − d
with
SB = B0 + b(i) − β(e)+f(a,d)
OC = C0 − c(i) − γ(e)+w + a
deﬁned as such.
13The utility of G (UG)i sg i v e nb ySB minus the price (or prices) λ, paid to the private
ﬁrms. Under traditional private provision, G pays λB to the builder and λP to the provider;
under partnership, G pays λPPP to the consortium. Finally, under public provision, G
pays λB to the builder and directly suﬀers the operational costs OC. We assume a fully
competitive market for the ﬁrms. Therefore, they are paid competitive prices by G and their
proﬁts are simply driven to the market ones, which we assume equal to 0. More speciﬁcally,
the proﬁt of the builder, ΠB, is given by the competitive price paid by G for its service, λB,
minus the level of investments he decides to undertake in equilibrium. The provider P is
paid a competitive price λP by G and incur in some operational costs, OC. If a partnership
is formed, then it is paid a price λppp by G and incurs in all the costs of the service, that
is i, e and OC. Finally, the worker’s utility (UL) depends on his wage w, the level of his
eﬀort d, and on the quality, or level, of the service which is provided. This is particularly
true when the good is a public or a collective one, as it is in our model. The parameter
δ,w i t hδ ∈ (0,1), may measure the sensitivity of the worker to the service. For instance,
local workers might be more aﬀected if they use the service they provide. We can interpret
δ also as a characteristic of the good itself, that is, the degree of its public dimension.
Finally, δ can reﬂect the worker’s commitment to the public service. The worker’s eﬀort d
directly increases SB through f(a,d) and indirectly increases the worker’s own utility. The
marginal contribution of d is increasing in a, that is,
∂2f(a,d)
∂a∂d > 0, and, in particular, without
any investment in a, d has no eﬀect: f(0,d)=0∀d. Recalling the previous example, a
radiologist might ﬁnd it impossible to interpret some analysis if the machine he uses is not
good enough. Finally, the worker has a reservation utility from not working equal to ¯ U.
The functions β(e),c (i), γ(e),b (i)a n df(a,d)e m b o d yt h ee ﬀects of the various invest-
ments on SB, OC and UL. The social beneﬁt function, that we deﬁned as the social eﬀect of
the service provided, is positively aﬀe c t e db o t hb yt h ep r o d u c t i v ei n v e s t m e n ti, undertaken
by the builder, and jointly by a and d. The unproductive investment e has a negative eﬀect
on the social beneﬁt. As regards the operational costs OC,t h e yd e c r e a s ew i t hb o t ht h e
builder’s investments, i and e. They also include the provider’s investment, a, and the wage
w of the worker, as he is employed by the provider.
The function f(a,d) appears twice in the payoﬀs functions. The ﬁrst time as a positive
contribution to SB. Both a and d positively aﬀect the quality of the service. The second
time, f(a,d) appears as a positive eﬀect on the worker’s utility. We can interpret this eﬀect
in diﬀerent ways. The most straightforward one is the presence of satisfaction from the
ﬁnal result of the job. A better result, which depends both on a and d, can make the worker
happier about himself. A second interpretation is that the worker can be a consumer himself,
therefore enjoying a share of the public or collective good that he helps to provide.
For technical reasons, we assume f(a,d) to be a Cobb-Douglas production function with








α + β < 1
If not strictly necessary to our computations, through the paper we will refer to f(a,d)i ni t s
generic expression. Finally, further technical assumptions about the functions above apply.
All the functions are non negative and increasing in their arguments. The function β(e),
which decreases the social beneﬁt, is strictly convex, whereas functions increasing proﬁts and
utilities (c(i);γ(e);b(i);f(a,d)) are strictly concave in their arguments. We further assume
that f(a,d)s a t i s ﬁes Inada conditions.
4.1.2 The benchmark case
Eﬃciency requires the maximization of the social welfare function (SWF), which we deﬁne
as the sum of all the agents’ payoﬀs. Taking into account all the cross payments, this is
equal to:
SWF = B0 + b(i) − β(e)+( 1+δ)f(a,d) − C0 + c(i)+γ(e) − i − e − a − d, (1)










[bi(i∗)+ci(i∗) − 1]i∗ =0
[−βe(e∗)+γe(e∗) − 1]e∗ =0
[(1 + δ)fa(a∗,d ∗) − 1]a∗ =0





and j∗ is the eﬃcient level of investment j.
We are keeping Hart’s assumptions about the solutions for i and e. These assumptions
refer to the existence of an interior solution for i and a corner one for e (that is, γe(0) −






(1 + δ)fa(a∗,d ∗) − 1=0
(1 + δ)fd(a∗,d ∗) − 1=0
Before analyzing the worker’s contribution, we recall Hart’s results (Hart, 2003) and highlight
the relationships between our models.
154.1.3 Hart (2003)
In this model, the government can choose only between traditional private provision and
PPPs. In the former case, the builder has no incentive in investing either in i or e, as he
does not consider the eﬀects of these investments on the provider’s operational costs OC
a n do nt h es o c i a lb e n e ﬁt SB. With a partnership between the builder and the provider, the
external eﬀects of e and i on OC are taken into account, but not the eﬀect on SB.T h er e s u l t
is that a partnership will provide a more eﬃcient level of investment i but a less eﬃcient
level of investment e. As far as investments in i and e are concerned, no diﬀerence emerges
between our two models. The worker worries only about the level of a and d, which are not
present in Hart (2003). In this way, comparisons between the models are easier. In addition,
the level of investments i and e reached under traditional private provision are the same that
we reach under public provision.
We can formalize this discussion, in order to better understand his results. At this point,
we focus only on investments in the ﬁrst stage: i and e. We label the investments under
traditional private provision, under partnerships and under public provision respectively as
ip,i ppp,i g and ep,e ppp,e g.
Investments under private provision Under private provision, the government signs
two short-term contracts with two diﬀerent private ﬁrms: B and P. The problem of the
builder is therefore the following:
max
i,e
ΠB = λB − i − e
In the second period, the problem of the provider is:
max
a ΠP = λP − OC
With the resulting investments:
ip = ep =0
None of the ﬁrms has an incentive in investing: the builder considers i and e simply as a
loss, as they do not inﬂuence its costs or productivity.
Investments under partnership When a partnership between B and P is formed, the
consortium takes into account the eﬀects of i and e on the provider’s costs. The governments
signs one long term contract with this consortium, whose problems is:
max
i,e,a
ΠPPP = λPPP − OC − i − e




16In this case the consortium takes into account the eﬀect of i and e on the provider’s costs.
As regards i, this is still insuﬃcient, as no weight is given to the social beneﬁt. As for e, the
lack of consideration for its negative eﬀect on social beneﬁts leads to an overinvestment.
Investments under public provision Finally, with public provision the government
signs only one short term contract with the builder and then provides the service or good
in-house. The problem of the builder is the same as with private provision:
max
i,e
ΠB = λB − i − e
In the second period, the public provider solves the following problem:
max
a UG = SB − λB − OC
With the resulting investments:
ig = eg =0
The builder does not make any diﬀerence about the identity of the provider, as long as
it is not part of a consortium. Therefore no investment in i and e will B’s choice, as the
investment in i is not contractible.
Proposition 1 is based on these results, which will be restated in Proposition 2 in the
light of our original contribution.
Proposition 1 (Hart, 2003 revisited) We can order the levels of investments reached
under diﬀerent provision mechanisms. We have that:
ip = ig <i ppp <i
∗
e
∗ = ep = eg <e ppp
Traditional private provision and public provision (as deﬁned above) are better when the
quality of the building can be easily detailed but the quality of the service cannot. In other
words, when it is relatively easier to write the contract about the quality of the building,
private provision or public provision minimize the ineﬃciency. The underinvestment in “i”
is not a serious issue and investment in “e”i se v e ne ﬃcient. Mutatis mutandis, partnerships
should be preferred when it is easier to measure or specify the quality of the service in the
contract.
Proof. See Hart (2003) and the discussion above.
We now present a model where the additional investments (by the provider and the
worker) can lead to diﬀerent choices. We ﬁrst introduce a setting with general functions,
a n dt h e nw ep r o v i d eam o r es p e c i ﬁce x a m p l e .
174.1.4 Private versus public employment
We can now compare public and private employment in a second best setting. To do this, it
is important to clarify a time-line of decisions in this economy (Graph 4.1).
At t =1 ,G decides what kind of provision it wants (public, private or a partnership).
Consequently, G also decides the identity of L0s employer and signs a particular contract:
with public or private provision this would be a short term contract with the builder B about
the quality of the building; with a partnership, this would be a long term contract with the
consortium of B and P about the quality of the service. At t =2 , the builder decides the
level of investments i and e. At t =3 , the provider decides the level of investment a and the
level of the wage w; in case of private provision, G previously signs a short term contract
with P about the quality of the service Finally, at t = 4 the worker observes a and w. Then,
he decides whether to accept the job or not and, in the positive case, what level of eﬀort d
to undertake.
Graph 4.1: Time line
G decides the identity of the provider
and offers contract to B and possibly P
The provider decides a and w
and offers a contract to L
B decides i and eL   decides whether to work and d
t
34 2 1
All these investments decisions are ex post observable, but are not veriﬁable. So, it is
not possible to write complete contracts and set up a system of payments and transfers such
that the eﬃcient investment levels are realized.
Having already shown the results for i and e, we can now focus only on the provider’s
problem with respect to w and a. The model is solved as a typical principal-agent one and
by backwards induction, starting from t = 4. It is important to stress that the worker’s
problem is independent of the identity of his e m p l o y e r( w h e r e a si t sc h o i c ei sn o t ,a sw e
will show later). We also notice that no diﬀerence arises between private provision and a
partnership. Therefore we analyze both the cases together.
At t =4 ,Lsolves the following problem:
max
d
w + δf(a,d) − d
s.t. d ≥ 0
Assuming f(a,d)=( aαdβ), we obtain the following ﬁrst order condition:
δβa
αd
β−1 =1 ( 3 )
We can rearrange the terms so that we have:




18where g(a) denotes the reaction function for the worker’s eﬀort. The worker’s choice is
therefore between working, and reacting to a according to (4), and not working, if the
incentive provided by the employer is not high enough:
max
©
w + δf(a,g(a)) − g(a), ¯ U
ª
In other words, the worker will accept a contract only if :
w + δf(a,g(a)) − g(a) ≥ ¯ U
The relationship between a and d is used by the principal at t =3 . We now analyze the
employer’s problem by discriminating between private and public provision. From the ﬁrst
order conditions of his problem, we already know that, for ﬁxed values of a and δ,dis
ineﬃciently low, as the worker takes into account only his private beneﬁt and not the entire
social one. With an abuse of notation, we call the worker’s socially optimal reaction function
g∗(a). So we can state that:






given our assumption on f(•)t h a tfad(a,d) > 0a n dfaa(a,d) < 0.
Private provision. At t = 3, the private provider P (the consortium would face a similar
situation: see proof of Lemma 5 below) must solve the following problem: the ﬁrm wants to
minimize its costs but has to consider the worker’s constraints. The individual rationality
(or participation) constraint IR states that the worker will accept the job only if it provides
him at least his reservation utility ¯ U. The incentive compatibility constraint (IC) states
that the action the worker will take on the job must be optimal from his point of view, and
directly follows from the ﬁrst order conditions of his maximization problem:
min
a,w OC = C0 − c(i) − γ(e)+w + a
s.t.: w + δ(aαdβ) − d ≥ ¯ UI R
d = g(a)=( δaαβ)
1
1−β IC
where i and e were chosen at t =2 ,a n dt h e r e f o r ec(i)a n dγ(e) are treated as constant terms.
The worker’s participation constraint is binding in equilibrium, as otherwise the principal
would have an incentive to decrease w. The provider has indeed two possibilities to attract
the worker, and can choose the cheapest one: it can either invest in some minimum level of a
or it can raise the wage, such that the reservation utility is equalized. We can ﬁrst substitute
IC into IR, and then, knowing that the latter is binding, we can directly substitute for w



















The ﬁrst order condition of the problem is:












=0 ( 8 )
The principal determines the value ap such that:
ap ∈ argminOC







F i n a l l y ,t h ew a g ei nt h ep r i v a t es e c t o r( wp = wppp) is easily determined from the worker’s
IC :
wp = ¯ U − δf(ap,d p)+dp
Public provision. With respect to the worker, the government must solve the following
(simpliﬁed)13 problem:
max
a,w UG =( aαdβ) − a − w
s.t.: w + δ(aαdβ) − d ≥ ¯ UI R
d = g(a)=( δaαβ)
1
1−β IC












− a − (δa
αβ)
1
1−β − ¯ U
¾
whose ﬁrst order condition is:












=0 ( 1 0 )
Finally, the government determines the value ag such that:
ag ∈ argmaxUG














Finally, the wage in the public sector (wg) is easily determined from the worker’s IR :
wg = ¯ U − δf(ag,d g)+dg
13We are ignoring the terms c(i)a n dγ(e) as the government has no control over them.
20Comments, comparison and an example. These results allow some initial comment.
Using Hart’s approach (Hart, 2003), we can state that if the characteristics of the facility
are easier to specify, the government should provide the service. If, on the contrary, the
quality of the service is easier to measure, then the choice is between public provision and
partnerships. Public provision is preferred when worker’s eﬀort is very relevant for the
success of the service.
We now formalize our ﬁndings with Proposition 2, which updates Proposition 1, and then
comment on it.
Proposition 2 We can compare the levels of investments provided under diﬀerent provision




ip = ig <i ppp <i ∗
e∗ = ep = eg <e ppp
appp = ap <a g <a ∗
dppp = dp <d g <d ∗
(12)
When we allow for public provision, for workers’ eﬀorts and investments in the second stage,
private provision is always dominated by public provision. Investments in i and e are the
same, but investments in a and d a r ec l o s e rt ot h ee ﬃcient level.
Proof. The ﬁrst two rows in (12) are part of Proposition 1 and have been proven above.
As regards, a and d, it follows from direct comparison of appp = ap in (9) and ag in
(11) that appp = ap <a g. The eﬃcient value of a, a∗, can be worked out by substituting








By comparing a∗ and ag, we obtain the following condition:









For the range of values of the parameters under consideration14, this condition is always
satisﬁed15 (equality holds for β =0 , but we do not consider this case). So we can state that:
appp = ap <a g <a
∗ (14)
Given (14), it must follow that:
dppp = dp <d g <d
∗ (15)
14That is, β ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ (0,1)
15The condition in (13) is formally proven in Appendix.
21The reason for the result in (15) is quite intuitive. In second best (public and private
provision), the worker’s reaction function g(a) is the same; therefore, if ap <a g, then it is
straightforward that dp <d g. Moreover, from the social planner’s problem, we can obtain






This is such that:
g(a) <g
∗(a) ∀a>0,
and so it is af o r t i o r itrue that, if ag <a ∗, then dg <d ∗.
As regards the result in (14), the intuition is that the public provider correctly takes
into account the full beneﬁtf r o ma and d. Nevertheless, this is not enough to produce an
eﬃcient level of a, as g(a) <g ∗(a). In other words, for any unit of investment a which is
undertaken by G, the return (social beneﬁt) is smaller than in the eﬃciency case, as the
worker’s contribution (g(a)) is ineﬃciently low.
In Graph 4.2, we show the ranking of the investments in a under diﬀerent provision
mechanisms.
Graph 4.2: The choice of a
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The government takes correctly into account both the social beneﬁt and the worker’s
private beneﬁt from the good. Nevertheless, we know from (6) that the beneﬁts are deﬁnitely
s m a l l e rt h a ni nt h eﬁrst best: both ag and dg are set at an ineﬃcient level.
The best choice is the one maximizing the SWF,a sd e ﬁn e di n( 1 ) . I nT a b l e4 . 2w e
compare the values taken by the SWF under diﬀerent provision schemes. The ﬁrst best
is never reached; from comparisons in (12) and in Table 4.2, and recalling Proposition 1,
Proposition 2 directly follows.
Table 4.2: The optimal choice
Private provision: SWFp : B0 +( 1+δ)f(ap,d p) − C0 − ap − dp
Public provision: SWFg : B0 +( 1+δ)f(ag,d g) − C0 − ag − dg
Partnership SWFppp : B0 + b(ippp) − β(eppp)+( 1+δ)f(ap,d p) − C0 + c(ippp)
+γ(eppp) − ippp − eppp − ap − dp
22We want to focus our comments in particular on a and d. As long as no social cost is
associated to the investment in the second stage (a), public provision is always the best
provision choice. The government is interested in maximizing the social beneﬁt, net of its
provision costs, and, even if it does not take into account all the beneﬁts from a, its choice is
the closest to the ﬁrst-best one. But this also means that public provision is better as long
as ap r o v i d e rc a ni n ﬂuence the quality of the service. Thei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ei n v e s t m e n ti s
summarized by the shape of the function f(•).
If we think about health services, for instance, investments in the provision stage could
be expensive and technological machinery. Even if a private provider could aﬀo r ds u c ha n
investment, it is not straightforward that he would undertake it. In education, these kinds of
expensive investments seem less frequent. Most of the issues usually regard the quality of the
building, something that the government cannot really inﬂuence. Our model would therefore
suggest that the health service should be publicly provided whereas education could be left
to the private sector.
Nevertheless, if we consider also the role of i and e, partnership may be better than
public provision. This is particularly true when the reduction in operational costs associated
to these investments is higher than the corresponding reduction in the social beneﬁt. Hart
(2003) reckons that health service should be provided under a PPP. Our model suggests
that the reduction in operational costs should oﬀset the reduction in social beneﬁtf o l l o w i n g
not only higher investments in i and e, but also lower investments in a and d. Recalling
how we stress the importance of complementarity between a and d, our model may actually
support the opinion that some of the staﬀ should be privately occupied and part of the staﬀ
publicly employed. In particular, the public sector should retain its control over workers
whose contribution is very high to the level of the service and leave the others to the private
sector.
The government is facing two kinds of choices: an investment choice (i.e.: the level of a)
and a provision choice (i.e.: the identity of the provider). The former choice induce distorted
level of investments, as we showed above. What about the latter? The maximization of the
SWF gives us a normative criterion to decide which provider is better. Nevertheless, in
reality governments are not social welfare maximizers but have their own utility functions.
In our model, we allow the government to have social concerns by considering SB as part
of its maximization problem. Nevertheless, UG does not consider all the utilities (or proﬁt
functions) of every agent in the economy. This may lead to a clash between what is best for
the society (i.e., a provision choice according to the SWF) and what is actually implemented
(i.e.: a provision choice according to UG, the utility function of the decision maker).
In other words, as the government is maximizing UG and not SWF,i tw o u l dc h o o s e
according to the resulting investments maximizing its utility function rather than the social
welfare function. Lemma 3 solves this doubt.
Lemma 3 There is no distortion in the second best “provision” choice by the government.
Proof. We can compare the government’s actual choice, based on UG, evaluated for diﬀerent
23provision choices, and the optimal one, based on SWF, evaluated in the same values. We
summarize this problem in Table 4.3.




G : SB − λB − λP = B0 +( 1+δ)f(ap,d p) − C0 − ap − dp − ¯ U
Public provision: U
g
G : SB − λB − OC = B0 +( 1+δ)f(ag,d g) − C0 − ag − dg − ¯ U
Partnership U
ppp
G : SB − λ = B0 + b(ippp) − β(eppp)+( 1+δ)f(ap,d p) − C0 + c(ippp)
+γ(eppp) − ippp − eppp − ap − dp − ¯ U
As ¯ U is simply a constant, the government faces the same problem as a hypothetical social
welfare maximizer. Therefore its provision choice is not distorted. When a partnership is
better than public provision according to a SWF criterion, then it is better also according
to G’s maximization problem. And so it is for the other way round.
The government is forced to consider the other agents’ proﬁt and utility functions, as he
is the ultimate payer for the service. Under public provision, its choice of a is not optimal
just because the worker’s reaction function is distorted.
As regards the role of workers, the fact that they are consumers makes them indirectly
sympathetic with the government’s preferences. Public provision is therefore better as work-
ers’ and government’s eﬀorts are complementary to the success of the service. Again, a
s i m i l a rc a v e a tr e g a r d i n gt h es h a p eo fd(•) is worth of mention. Public employment is better
as long as the workers’ contribution to the quality of the service is relevant. As suggested
above, this result might also justify the case for mixed employment schemes. For instance,
in the case of public transport, our model may suggest that buses designers should be public
employees whereas it doesn’t really matter who hires, for instance, the administrative staﬀ.
Additional comments follow the example below.
Example 4 In this example, we only focus on the worker’s problem about “d”a n dt h e
principal’s choice about “a”. In other words, we completely ignore issues about the remaining





that is, the contribution of the two investments is symmetric. The FOCs in the ﬁrst best
case are:
½ ∂SWF
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Finally, we can determine wages; recalling that in equilibrium:
w = ¯ U − δf(a,d)+d
we have:
½
wp = ¯ U − 2(δ
3)3





Example 4 gives us the opportunity to draw some additional considerations about wages
in the private and the public sector, but has no direct relevance for the PPP debate.
From (16), we know that if δ =0 , there is no reason why we should observe wage
diﬀerentials in the private and in the public sector. We introduced δ as a characteristic of
the worker, who is also the consumer of the good he produces. We also oﬀered a diﬀerent
interpretation of δ, that is, the degree of public dimension of the good itself. In public and
private ﬁrms producing the same kind of pure private good, we expect workers to demand
the same wage. If they do not, it is probably because of other dimensions of the problem
(e.g.: job security, retirement plans). What our model explains is why people accept similar
jobs in the public sector for lower monetary incentives (see also, for example, Dixit, 2002a
and 2002b). They do so as long as they believe the can cooperate with their employer to
satisfy their preferences.
The general result is stated and proven in Lemma 5.
25Lemma 5 The wage of the worker in the private sector is never lower than the wage in the
public sector:
wg ≤ wp = wppp (17)
Proof. First of all, we show that wp = wppp. As explained above, at t = 3 a private provider
P solves the following problem:
min
a
©¯ U − δf(a,g(a)) + a + g(a)+C0
ª
whereas a consortium has a slightly diﬀe r e n tc o s tf u n c t i o n :
min
a
©¯ U − δf(a,g(a)) + a + g(a)+C0 − c(ippp) − γ(eppp)+ippp + eppp
ª
The diﬀerence emerges as, with traditional private provision, P cannot control i and e.B u t ,
as at t = 3 both the private provider P and the consortium only choose a, their solution is
the same, and so it is the wage they pay to L.
Then, we know that:
wg = ¯ U − δf(ag,d g)+dg
wp = ¯ U − δf(ap,d p)+dp
and that:
ap <a g;dp <d g
so
f(ag,d g) >f(ap,d p)
The function f(a,d)i si n c r e a s i n gi na by assumption. This means that:
f(ag,d p) >f(ap,d p)
The utility δf(a,d) − d that a public worker obtains from observing ag and producing dg
must be bigger than the his utility from observing ag and producing dp. Otherwise, he would
be better oﬀ by decreasing his eﬀort level to dp. Therefore:
δf(ag,d g) − dg > δf(ap,d p) − dp
and (17) follows.
Under a diﬀerent point of view, the model can explain why people are happy to work
for free in charities like Oxfam but they require a wage from, say, Blackwell’s. Though the
economic activity is the same (selling books), people working in Oxfam probably have some
preferences for the social activity of the charity.
This conclusion is extremely similar to the one in Besley and Ghatak (2004), except for
the fact that we do not model our workers using “types” but explicit utility functions. G
and L have, at least partially, the same objective, which is the quality of the service. This
a r g u m e n tc a nb ee x p r e s s e di nB e s l e ya n dG h a t a k ’ st e r m sa s : “ G and L are of the same
type”.
264.1.5 The choice under budget constraint
A ﬁnal remark about the (second) best provision choice is worthy of mention. So far we
have implicitly assumed that G could spend any amount of money, that is, its choice was
unconstrained. It can be interesting to compare the three provision choices purely in terms
o ft h e i rc o s tt ot h eg o v e r n m e n t ,t h a ti s ,w i t h o u tc o n s i d e r i n gt h es o c i a lb e n e ﬁtt h e yi m p l y .
Let’s deﬁne TC as the total cost function for the government. Under diﬀerent provision
mechanisms, we have three possible cases:
TC




g = λB + OC
where:
λB = ip + ep
λP = C0 − c(ip) − γ(ep)+ap + w
λPPP = C0 − c(ippp) − γ(eppp)+appp + w
and:
w = ¯ U − δf(a,d)+d
Under private and public provision, λB =0 , as ip = ep =0 . Following the analysis in the
previous sections, and recalling that ap = appp and dp = dppp, we can conclude that:
TC
p = C0 + ap + ¯ U − δf(ap,d p)+dp (18)
TC
ppp = C0 + ippp + eppp − c(ippp) − γ(eppp)+ap + ¯ U − δf(ap,d p)+dp (19)
TC
g = C0 + ag + ¯ U − δf(ag,d g)+dg (20)
Lemma 6 directly follows.
Lemma 6 Partnerships are the cheapest provision mechanism: TCppp <TC p <TC g




p + ippp + eppp − c(ippp) − γ(eppp)
The quantity c(ippp)+γ(eppp)−ippp −eppp must be positive for internal solutions of i and e,
as it is maximized by the partnership. Therefore TCppp <TC p.
As regards TCp <TC g, the comparison reduces to the following:
ap − δf(ap,d p)+dp ≶ ag − δf(ag,d g)+dg
The left hand side of the inequality corresponds to the private provider’s minimization prob-
lem, as expressed in (7). Therefore, it is at its minimum exactly when a = ap. So the right
hand side must be bigger.
When G hires a partnership, it incurs the lowest possible price λPPP for the service. A
partnership obtains operational costs savings which neither a public nor a private provider
can realize. The private sector pays a higher wage, but this wage is not the only labour cost.
Both the public and the private sector must give their worker a level of utility equal to ¯ U.
What the government saves in w must be paid through a higher investment in a. Our model
suggests that private provision (traditional or partnership) is a good way of realizing savings
for the government and conﬁrms the common opinion that private provision is cheaper.
Whether it is also preferable from a social welfare point of view is not always clear, as
stated in Proposition 2.
Partnerships are chosen because they provide “value for money”: this criterion is always
realized when the government does not have a budget constraint. If G is bounded to spend
no more than some level TC < TCg, then privatization might be an ineﬃcient solution,
though the only available one.
4.2 A wider choice
In this subsection, we want to show that the scope for public provision is not limited by the
presence of workers. Eﬃciency or ineﬃciency of public provision can have also a diﬀerent
source. In order to do this, we introduce some social costs associated to the investment in the
second stage (a), with the aim of compensating the previous bias against traditional private
provision. As anticipated, we completely ignore the role of workers. The rest of the setting
is the same as in the previous section. The main diﬀerence concerns the government’s utility
function, which is now equal to:
UG = θSB +( 1− θ)PB
where:
SB = B0 + b(i) − β(e)+f(a)
28is the social beneﬁt given by the investments in the production (building and running)
process; and
PB= n(a)
is the private beneﬁt for the public provider. PBcan have the following interpretation: n(a)
is the probability of being re-elected due to the votes-catching investment a; a has a positive
eﬀect on the collective beneﬁt, but might be used also to obtain electoral consensus (e.g.,
through excessive employment).
The parameter (1−θ), with θ ∈ (0,1), can be interpreted as the degree of corruptibility
of the government. In the previous subsection, we simply assumed θ =1 .
We further assume that the private beneﬁt PB is a complete waste for the society; that
is, an investment of a in the second stage creates an increase in the social beneﬁte q u a lt o
f(a) but also a social cost (excessive staﬀ, propaganda) equal to n(a). Therefore:
SC = n(a)
The private ﬁrms’ objective functions are unchanged:
ΠB = λB − i − e
ΠP = λP − OC
ΠPPP = λPPP − i − e − OC
with
OC = C0 − c(i) − γ(e)+a
As before, the proﬁt of the builder, ΠB, is given by the competitive price paid by G for
its service, λB, minus the level of investments he decides to undertake in equilibrium. The
provider P is paid a competitive price λP by G and incur in some operational costs, OC. If
a partnership is formed, then it is paid a price λPPP by G and incurs in all the costs of the
service, that is i, e and OC.
All the previous assumptions about the functions above still apply. In particular, we recall
that β(e) is strictly convex whereas c(i),γ(e),b(i),f(a)a n da l s on(a) are strictly concave.
Eﬃciency requires the maximization of the following social welfare function, which is the
algebraic sum of objective functions of the subjects in this economy and of the social costs
function. Once taken into account all the cross payments, this is equal to:
SWF = UG + ΠB + ΠP − SC (21)
= θ[B0 + b(i) − β(e)+f(a)] − θn(a) − C0 + c(i)+γ(e) − i − e − a










[θbi(i∗)+ci(i∗) − 1]i∗ =0
[−θβe(e∗)+γe(e∗) − 1]e∗ =0




and j∗ is the eﬃcient level of investment j.
We are still keeping Hart’s assumptions about the solutions for i and e. In addition, we









We are now ready to compare the relative ineﬃciencies of the three forms of provision.
4.2.1 Investments under private provision
Under private provision, the government signs two short-term contracts with two diﬀerent
private ﬁrms: B and P. The problem of the builder is therefore the following:
max
i,e
ΠB = λB − i − e
In the second period, the problem of the provider is:
max
a ΠP = λP − OC
With the resulting investments:
ip = ep = ap =0
None of the ﬁrms has an incentive in investing: the builder considers i and e simply as a
loss, as they do not inﬂuence its costs or productivity. The same holds for the provider and
a.
4.2.2 Investments under partnership
When a partnership between B and P is formed, the consortium takes into account the
eﬀects of i and e on the provider’s costs. The governments signs one long term contract with
this consortium , whose problems is:
max
i,e,a
ΠPPP = λPPP − OC − i − e







In this case the consortium takes into account the eﬀect of i and e on the provider’s costs.
As regards i, this is still insuﬃcient, as no weight is given to the social beneﬁt. As for e, the
lack of consideration for the its negative eﬀect on social beneﬁts leads to an overinvestment.
The consortium still does not undertake any investment in a.
4.2.3 Investments under public provision
Finally, with public provision the government signs only one short term contract with the
builder and then provides the service or good in-house. The problem of the builder is the
same as with private provision:
max
i,e
ΠB = λB − i − e
In the second period, the public provider partially takes into account the eﬀects of the
investment a on the collective beneﬁt (but also on its private one). The problem for the
government is::
max
a UG = θCB +( 1− θ)PB










The builder does not make any diﬀerence about the identity of the provider, as long as it
is not part of a consortium. Therefore no investment in i and e will be undertaken. The
government is investing in a, as it correctly takes into account its eﬀect on the social beneﬁt.
Nevertheless, this provision is still ineﬃcient, as G does not consider the existence of social
costs.
4.2.4 Comparison and comments
Hart’s suggestions still hold but we now have to take into account a third option. Given
our discussion, we can state that public provision is good when traditional privatization is
better then partnership and social costs are low. Following Hart (2003), traditional private
provision is better than partnership when the characteristics of the facility are easier to
specify. When social costs are high, traditional private provision should be preferred. If
the quality of the service is easier to measure, then the choice is between public provision
and partnerships. With low social costs, public provision should be preferred. Proposition
7 formalizes this result.
31Proposition 7 When the government has a private beneﬁt from the investment “a”, the




ip = ig <i ppp <i ∗
e∗ = ep = eg <e ppp
appp = ap =0<a ∗ <a g
(24)
Proof. The ﬁrst two rows are part of Proposition 1 and have been proven above.
As regards a,f r o m( 2 2 )w ek n o wt h a tt h ee ﬃcient level of a, a∗, is positive: so it is always
higher than appp = ap =0 .
Furthermore, from direct comparison of (22) and (23) and given our concavity assump-






> −1, ∀θ ∈ (0,1)
Graph 4.3 shows the relations among i,e and a under diﬀerent provision choices. The
best choice is the one maximizing the SWF, as deﬁn e di n( 2 1 ) .I nt a b l e4 . 4w ec o m p a r et h e
values taken by the SWF under diﬀerent provision schemes. The ﬁr s tb e s ti sn e v e rr e a c h e d ;
from comparisons in (24) and in Table 4.4, and recalling Proposition 1, Proposition 7 directly
follows.
Table 4.4: The optimal choice
Private provision: SWFp : θB0 − C0
Public provision: SWFg : θ[B0 + f(ag) − n(ag)] − C0 − ag
Partnership SWFppp : θ[B0 + b(ippp) − β(eppp)] − C0 + c(ippp)+γ(eppp)
−ippp − eppp
Graph 4.3: The choice of the provider
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Public provision is unambiguously bad when the government can easily use the facility
(or the service itself) to maximize its private beneﬁt. That is, when the social cost is very
relevant or even bigger than the social beneﬁt( i nw h i c hc a s e ,a should probably be equal
to 0). For instance, in Italy, schools are typically seen as places where hiring teachers is a
fast (but very costly) way of increasing consensus. The model suggests that education could
be eﬃciently left to private providers to avoid overstaﬃng. Prisons, on the contrary, appear
to have a very low “electoral” characteristic (overstaﬃng, for instance, is never an issue),
therefore public provision could be better.
The fact that, in reality, the provision of a lot of the collective goods is not (fully)
privatized (e.g.: education) does not weaken our conclusions. In fact, our model provides a
rationale for ineﬃcient government’s choices: if the private beneﬁt associated to the provision
of a good is big enough, then the government, who actually decides about the identity of the
provider, does not want to lose it. We state this result more formally in Lemma 8.
Lemma 8 The choice of the government is ineﬃciently biased towards public provision.
Proof. We can compare the government’s actual choice, based on UG, evaluated for diﬀerent
provision choices, and the optimal one, based on SWF, evaluated in the same values. We
summarize this problem in Table 4.5.




G : SB − λB − λP = θB0 − C0
Public provision: U
g
G : SB − λB − OC = θ[B0 + f(ag)] + (1 − θ)n(ag) − ag
Partnership U
ppp
G : SB − λ = θ[B0 + b(ippp) − β(eppp)] − C0 + c(ippp)
+γ(eppp) − ippp − eppp
As (1 − θ)n(a) > −θn(a) for any positive value of the social cost n(a), the government’s
utility is distorted towards public provision, whereas the choice between partnership and
traditional privatization is still (constrained) optimal.
It is worth noting that, in the analysis above, we could substitute the government with
a not-for-proﬁt institution, if we think that G is always incapable of providing the service
33in-house. In the case of a not-for-proﬁt provider, our model recalls the one in Dixit (2002b).
Beside the interest for the social beneﬁt, these organizations might have also private beneﬁts
(e.g.: the spread of their religious beliefs) which are not necessarily compatible with public
interests.
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to introduce new and more complete models of partnerships. In
particular, we distinguish from the existing literature in our eﬀort to introduce the govern-
ment as an alternative provider and in studying the more eﬃcient employment choices.
There is a trade oﬀ given by the choice of a public provider: the government G is the only
employer which is able to provide a more eﬃcient incentive to the worker. Nevertheless, if
G sees the opportunity of exploiting these investments for a private beneﬁt( f o ri n s t a n c e ,f o r
higher probability of election), then the scope for public provision is dramatically reduced.
Public provision, as opposed to partnerships, is also particularly good when employer’s and
employee’s eﬀort are complementary and relevant. Our models seem to suggest that health
service, usually requiring very expensive investments by the provider, should be kept under
the public sector. On the contrary, education can be contract out to the private sector (in
particular, to partnerships). This is especially true in countries where employing teachers is
considered a way of buying consensus.
Our model also explains wage diﬀerentials in the private and the public sector: public
workers might accept lower wages, due to the ability of the public provider to increase the
worker’s utility through the investment in a.
Finally, our model stresses that often the government choice is ﬁnancially constrained.
In this case, the solution is biased towards the private sector, and in particular partnerships,
which are the cheapest alternative.
Further research should be aimed at developing at least the following problem: what
would happen if there were diﬀerent types of workers or diﬀerent types of workers’ eﬀorts
(i.e.: laziness)? We may expect some workers to be more eﬃciently hired and managed by
a private provider, so that a further trade oﬀ emerges. The model above is indeed very
incomplete and too counter-intuitive: it might further explain “public service motivation”
as in Francois (2000) and the presence of higher wages in the public sector: they are paid
to compensate the lower satisfaction of the workers. Nevertheless, in reality private workers
are often seen as very productive whereas in our model they appear to be lazier.
6 Appendix: Proof of the condition in (13)








34is always satisﬁed for any β,δ ∈ (0,1).
First of all, we apply a logarithmic transformation (which is positive monotonic) to both









<L o g[1 + δ]
Therefore:
βLogδ +( 1− β)Log[1 + δ − δβ] − (1 − β)Log[1 − β] − Log[1 + δ] < 0
We evaluate the function on the left hand side in β = 0 and obtain:
Log[1 + δ] − Log[1] − Log[1 + δ]=0
As β ∈ (0,1), it is now suﬃcient to show that the ﬁrst derivative with respect to β of the
function on the left hand side of the inequality is always negative:
∂




− Log[1 + δ − δβ]+
1 − β
1 − β
+ Log[1 − β] < 0
which reduces to:











where e is the Napier’s constant16. It is easier to solve this inequality in (25) if we reduce it
to a one variable problem; we set:
1+δ − δβ = x
and it can be easily checked that, for β ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ (0,1), we have:
1 ≤ x ≤ 2






16The constant e is occasionally called Euler’s number after the Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler,
or Napier’s constant in honour of the Scottish mathematician John Napier who introduced logarithms. In
honour of the University where I studied and of the Country I’ve been living in for the last four years, I












)x reaches its minimum when x equals its maximum possible value (= 2).
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